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Abstract 
 This research aims to analyse the effect of corporate governance on value 
relevance of accounting information. The sample used in this research is 164 non-
financial companies that listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 5 years which 2012-
2016. EPS and NAV are used as the reflection of accounting information needed 
by investors. Researcher employed Ohlson regression model that depend on shares 
price as its dependent variable. The proxies for corporate governance are size of 
board directors, the proportion of independent commissioners, managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership.  
 The finding from this research shows that corporate governance has impact 
on the value relevance of EPS and NAV in Indonesia, whether it is positively or 
negatively. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; value relevance; earning per share; net asset 
value; size of board directors; the proportion of independent commissioners, 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
In Indonesia, corporate governance starts to raise up in 1997-1998 as 
important aspect in business continuity, when the countries all over the world 
experienced global economy and social crisis. Siamat (2004) captures the 
phenomenon in Indonesia when economy crisis was aggravated by politic 
conjuncture. The fall of Soeharto’s government was leading to economic 
damage. This is marked by the declining of the gross domestic product level in 
1998 which is -13.68% rather than 4.65% in 1997. In addition, the effect of 
economy crisis is the inflation rate that increase to be 77.63% from 11.05%. 
Many companies are bankrupt and lost their business because of the weakened 
of Rupiah value. 
Allegedly, bad corporate governance is the cause of politic and economy 
crisis. Furthermore, bad corporate governance had leaded the loss of many 
parties. One of the example of bad corporate governance is the case of PT. 
Kimia Farma in 2002, which manipulated their net income. It shows that PT. 
Kimia Farma has bad corporate governance in managing their reporting activity. 
Shareholders would consider their performance as disadvantage in doing 
investment. 
Indonesia’s government started to introduce the concept of corporate 
governance in order to prevent further negative effect that caused by the crisis. 
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From that on, management, government, and investors have serious concern 
toward corporate governance issues.  
The development of global economy is increasing nowadays. Every 
company are demanded to be able to catch the national or international business 
opportunities. This phenomenon leads to more competition in business 
environment where the competitors must have the unique value as the advantage 
and good strategy in order to survive. Moreover, company should implement 
the management which has transparency, focuses on the alteration, gradually 
innovated, and be able to develop the leadership collectively (Barbey, 2000).  
By looking to this crucial globalization, it is necessary to have a system 
which can control and manage the company because they have to be able to 
adjust themselves and ready to compete or even take challenge. Company need 
a good governance for organizationally maintaining the adapted value and 
attaining the goals.  
Corporate governance is a set of system and structure for controlling 
company’s business and problem, in order to improve the business prosperity 
and corporate accountability. The ultimate goal of corporate governance is 
actualizing shareholders’ value in long-term and with regard to other 
stakeholders’ interests. According to Warsono et al. (2009), corporate 
governance is a system that contains of functions run by major parties. 
Corporate governance is needed for maximizing the firm value creation as 
economy or social entity through the general accepted principal 
implementation. 
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Based on BPKP (Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan), the 
needs of corporate governance are divided into two backgrounds, such as 
practically background and academically background. Practically background 
can be seen by looking backward when US had to do restructuration of their 
corporate governance as the cause of market crash in 1929. Second is the 
academically background, where the needs of corporate governance is related 
to the agency theory. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory is relationship that 
exist by the agreement between principal and agent. The conflict arises because 
of interest differentiation between principal and agent that must be managed to 
prevent loss on each parties. For instance, companies tend to not attentive about 
investors’ interest. It can be said that the companies have a weak corporate 
governance if this agency problem happen.                   
According to National Committee of Corporate Governance, there are 5 
principles about corporate governance, as follows; (1) transparency is about 
information honesty. To maintain the companies’ objectivity, they must provide 
accessible and understandable relevance information for investors, creditors or 
other parties. (2) Accountability means the clarity of functions, structure, 
system, and performance responsibility. Companies must managed-well, 
measureable, and in accordance with companies’ interest while considering 
shareholders’ interest. (3) Responsibility is about how responsible the 
companies in obeying rule of laws, such as: industrial relation, pay taxes, health 
and safety insurance, and the others responsibility towards government, 
environment, and citizen. (4) Independency is about the companies must be 
  
4 
 
managed independently and professionally in order to avoid interests collision 
and intervened by other parties. (5) Fairness is a condition to fulfil the rights 
and to satisfy shareholders’ interests based on the laws and regulations. 
Variables used as corporate governance’s proxies in this study are: size of 
board director, the proportion of independent commissioners, managerial 
ownership, and institutional ownership. Based on Daniri (2005), these proxies 
can describe the sense of corporate governance principals. The principle of 
transparency is related to the managerial ownership; responsibility is associated 
with the size of board directors; accountability and independency is associated 
with the independent commissioners; and also the fairness principle is related 
to institutional ownership. 
The value relevance of accounting information measured by shares price 
through explanatory variable such as earning per share and net asset value. This 
is based on price model that developed by Ohlson. Price regression model has 
bigger explanatory power (R2) than return regression model. It is because price 
regression model is reflecting the cumulative effect from accounting variables 
through shares price (Kothari & Zimmerman, 1995). 
Corporate board of directors play a central role in the corporate governance 
of modern companies. Authors such as Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) state 
that boards of directors are responsible for controlling, evaluating, and 
disciplining the company’s management and oversee the financial reporting is 
one of the most important responsibilities for the board from the point of view 
of creditors.  
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The proportion of independent commissioner captures the ratio of non-
executive commissioners. Based on Yermack (1996), it is generally accepted 
that the board is more independent and efficient if there is higher ratio of 
external directors. In conclusion, if there are more external commissioners on 
corporate board, it will give more effectiveness in performing their duties in 
doing wealth maximization toward shareholders through its capacity to monitor 
and control inefficiency of managerial behaviour.  
Managerial ownership and institutional ownership are one of the important 
pillars in corporate governance mechanism. Faizal (2011) states that managerial 
ownership is the level of shares ownership by management that actively take 
part in decision making process. Managerial ownership is measured by the 
proportion of shares own by companies’ management in the end of period that 
stated in percentage. Based on Itturiaga and Sanz (2000), managerial ownership 
can be explained from two perspectives namely the agency approach, and the 
asymmetric information approach. Agency approach considers managerial 
ownership is tool to reduce the agency conflict between shareholders and 
companies. Asymmetric information approach is looking at mechanisms of 
managerial ownership structure as a way to reduce the imbalance between 
insider and outsider information through disclosure in capital markets. 
H. Chung (2009) defines the institutional ownership as the fraction of a 
firm’s shares that are held by institutional investors. Institutional investors can 
monitor and control the investment activities of the companies. By the existing 
of institutional ownership mechanism, it will minimize fraud in providing 
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financial information and automatically align the interest between management 
and shareholders. 
Mensah et al. (2003) indicates that corporate governance facilitates 
development by ensuring the efficient allocation of economic resources. One of 
the pillars that supports corporate governance in the efficient allocation funds 
is adequate information, both financial and non-financial. Shareholders demand 
financial reporting in order to evaluate the performance of management. 
Nevertheless, because of the weak monitoring of managerial behaviour, 
management could mislead outsiders by providing accounting information that 
does not reflect the true condition (not transparent). In this case, the accounting 
information is useless for valuing the companies. Corporate governance is 
expected to reduce management opportunistic behaviour and hence, it leads to 
be more relevant and credible accounting information for outsiders. 
The concept of value relevance of accounting information is emphasizing 
on how the accounting information has the value relevant for market participant. 
This concept explains the investors’ reaction toward accounting information 
announcement. According to Suwardjono (2010), value relevance defined as 
the power of assistance of an information in assisting or explaining some 
alternative decision. So the user can make a decision easily.  
This concept also associated with decision usefulness theory. The primary 
purpose of financial reporting is providing useful information for making 
investment decisions.  The value relevance of accounting information is defined 
as the explanatory power of accounting information in explaining corporate 
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value based on market value that will be useful for investors in making 
investment decision. 
Based on Ball and Brown (1968), accounting information is reflected on 
shares price. Accounting information is very important particle in decision 
making process. Companies with high quality accounting information will 
positively affect the capital providers and other shareholders. Financial 
reporting should be prepared with high quality and integrity. Based on Alkdai 
and Hanefah (2012), company exhibits high quality of accounting when they 
provide information with less earnings management, more conservatism 
accounting, and more value relevance of accounting information. 
The issues of value relevance become an important factor. It is worth to be 
researched because of the importance of financial statements in communicating 
firm details to the shareholders and public at large. 
 
1.2.Research Question 
Corporate governance tends to point out the system of rules, practices, and 
process done by company, in order to attain their goals while regarding the 
major parties in company. By having good corporate governance, hopefully it 
will be align the interest of shareholders and management. 
Together with corporate governance mechanism, the study about value 
relevance of accounting information such as earning per share and net asset 
value are seeking a safe environment for shareholders, investors, creditors, and 
other parties through transparency code. The formulation of the research 
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problem to be studied related to corporate governance and value relevance of 
accounting information stated in the question: 
1. Does the size of board directors significantly influence the value 
relevance of earning per share (EPS) and net asset value (NAV)? 
2. Does the proportion of independent commissioners significantly 
influence the value relevance of earning per share (EPS) and net asset 
value (NAV)? 
3. Does the managerial ownership significantly influence the value 
relevance of earning per share (EPS) and net asset value (NAV)? 
4. Does the institutional ownership significantly influence the value 
relevance of earning per share (EPS) and net asset value (NAV)? 
 
1.3. Research Objectives 
This study aims to provide empirical evidence related to corporate 
governance on value relevance of accounting information; and determine 
whether the size of board directors, the proportion of independent board, 
managerial ownership also institutional ownership influence the value 
relevance of accounting information especially earning per share (EPS) and net 
asset value (NAV) for non-financial companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in the year 2012 - 2016. 
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1.4. Research Contribution 
Hopefully, this research will be useful for: 
1. Investor 
To provide information for investor about the effect of good 
corporate governance on value relevance of accounting 
information. This study is expected to be used as a base for 
decision making in trading process. 
2. Companies’ management 
To provide information about good corporate governance affect 
the value relevance of accounting information and as a 
measurement whether companies have provide relevance 
financial statement. 
3. Further research 
To provide financial information for adding knowledge and 
supporting further research related to this study. 
 
1.5. Writing Structure 
CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION 
This first chapter includes research background, 
research question, research objectives, research 
contribution, steps in analysing the data, and writing 
structure. 
CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
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This chapter contains theories, relevant concepts, 
previous study, theoretical framework, also the 
development of hypothesis. 
 
 
CHAPTER III  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter reveals about the data used in this study 
like research type, population and sample, data 
collection method, variables measurement, data 
analysis and research models. 
CHAPTER IV  DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter consists of the result of research and the 
discussion whether the result in accordance with the 
criteria and proved the hypothesis. 
CHAPTER V  CONCLUSION 
This final chapter includes the conclusion, 
suggestion for further research, and limitation of this 
research. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
2.1.1. Agency Theory 
Corporate governance is a concept based on agency theory. 
Agency theory is business relationship between agent (management) 
and principal (shareholders) that conducted by the existence of 
contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Based on this relationship, 
agency theory is concerning to solve problem that exists because of 
unaligned goals or desires between these two parties. The agent is 
entrusted by principal to manage the usage and control the resources. 
Agent is expected to be able in optimizing profits for principal, in 
order to obtain compensation according to the contract.  
The application of agency theory can be realized in the 
business contract that will organize the proportion of right and 
obligation between principal and agent while considering the overall 
profits. Business contract must contain the fairness in balancing the 
right and obligation for every party. Based on Scott (1997), the 
conclusion of agency theory is design of good contract in aligning 
interest of principal and agent. 
Eisenhard (1989) conveys there are three assumption as the 
base of agency theory: 
a. Humanity assumption 
  
12 
 
The human nature assumption emphasizes about the 
characteristic human that prioritize self-interest, own 
bounded rationality, and mostly risk aversion. 
b. Organizational assumption 
Organizational assumption emphasizes on the existence 
of: (a) conflict among organization member, (b) 
efficiency as the criteria of productivity, and (c) 
asymmetry information between agent and principal.  
c. Informational assumption 
This assumption assumes that information is a 
commodity that can be traded.  
Shareholders as the principal have the right to access the 
company’s internal information. Agent who operates the company 
have the overall information about operational and performance of 
the company in real term, but they do not have absolute authority in 
making decision. Especially the decisions that concerned about 
strategically, globally, and long-term affected.  
Management have to give information about companies’ 
condition, for instance through accounting information disclosure 
which is financial report. External information users really need 
financial report because it is very important for them as signal of 
companies’ condition. Imbalance information distribution will 
triggered asymmetry information.  Together with high level of 
asymmetry information between agent and principal, the external 
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parties dependency toward accounting numbers and management 
tendency to earn their own advantage, will cause a great desire for 
managers to manipulate the work reported for self-interest.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) said that corporate governance is 
one of the major tools that used in aligning management interest with 
those shareholders. If corporate governance could be implemented 
well in companies, it will reduce agency cost. Agency cost is paid 
by management nor do shareholders, which is happen because of 
agency conflict exist. 
 
2.1.2. Corporate Governance 
The term of good corporate governance firstly was discussed 
in the year of 1992 by Cadburry Committee, which this term are used 
in their report (known as Cadburry Report). Then this report was a 
great turning point in corporate governance discussion all over the 
world. 
Corporate governance is raise in the year of 90’s when the 
global economy crisis happen in almost all over Asia and America. 
This is caused by the bad corporate governance that can be seen in 
that time about bad system of law, inconsistency of audit and 
accounting standard, low banking practices and the careless 
situation of boards of directors to minority shareholders. 
Since it becomes polemic in business field, corporate 
governance has been studied by a lot of academicians. They do 
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research and give evidence and new concept. According to Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), corporate governance is relating to the way in 
convincing the shareholders to obtain appropriate return towards the 
planted investment. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development states that corporate governance tends to organize the 
duties segregation in a company, manages the rights and obligations 
of those who concerned to the life of the company (shareholders, 
board of committee and managers). Okeahalan and Akinboade 
(2003) revealed about the goals of corporate governance are the 
search to create a balance between individual and general goals, to 
ensure the efficiency in allocating the resources, accountability in 
the use of power, also aligning the interest of individuals, 
corporations and society. 
Based on National Committee on Corporate Governance, 
there are five codes in implementing good corporate governance 
such as transparency, accountability, responsibility, independency, 
and fairness. Company which emphasize these codes is believed will 
has good corporate governance. Empirically by Lukuhay (2002), 
investor is willing to give high premium to the company that employ 
corporate governance codes well. 
Klai (2011) found that there is relationship between 
corporate governance and financial reporting quality of Tunisian 
companies. The research reveals the variables of corporate 
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governance which are board of directors and the ownership 
structure, is related to the quality of financial reporting. According 
to Gjorgieva-Trajkovska and Kostadinovski (2011), the importance 
in providing high quality financial information is capital providers 
and other stakeholders will make investment, credit, and resource 
allocation decisions that enhance overall market efficiency. 
 
2.1.3. Financial Reporting and Value Relevance  
Indonesian market Based on SFAC No. 8, the objective of 
financial reporting is provide high quality accounting information 
that is useful to present and potential investors, creditors and other 
users in making rational investment, credit, and similar decisions. 
Other than that, financial reporting is expected to help the users to 
assess the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective cash 
receipts. 
Financial information plays a vital role in economic cycle. 
Greuning (2009) posits that financial data has purpose: 
1. Provide information to facilitate capital flow from 
international investors 
2. Show management’s stewardship of the resources 
entrusted to it. 
Financial reporting is the important key for investors, 
creditors, and other users for evaluating the company’ or even 
manager’ performance. Financial reporting should be relevant 
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because it is one of measurement tool for decision making process. 
According to Beaver (2001), value relevance approach can measure 
the relevance of accounting information because it is reflected shares 
price.  
Ohlson (1995) found that earning as variable is triggered has 
a relevant value because it has statistics relation with shares price 
which is reflects firm value. By this findings, it can be concluded 
that value relevance shows how well the earnings information can 
represent the information used by users in valuing the company. 
The essence of value relevance of accounting information is 
the capability in explaining the value of a company through shares 
price. So, value relevance is directed to investigate the empirical 
relationship between shares price and those accounting numbers.  
The study of value relevance is developed to set the advantage of 
accounting values towards the valuation of company’s equity. 
According to Francis and Schipper, there are four approaches used 
to understand about the value relevance of accounting information, 
among than others: 
1. Fundamental analysis, that accounting information 
affects the shares price changes and detects the existence 
of shares price deviation. 
2. Prediction, that accounting information can be classified 
as relevant if there is ability to predict the prospect of 
company performance in the future.  
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3. Embodiment of value relevance information, that 
accounting information can be classified as relevant if 
investors can use accounting information for setting the 
shares price.  
4. Value relevance measurement, that the value relevance 
of accounting information is measured toward the ability 
in understanding and summarizing business activity and 
similar activity. 
According to Fiador (2013), corporate governance and 
financial reporting standard seek to create a safe environment for 
stakeholders through a culture of transparency. Gabriel (2011) 
demonstrates that the structure of corporate governance can 
positively influence the quality of accounting information produced 
by a company and disclosed to stockholders. Corporate governance 
mechanisms are assumed to reduce management opportunistic 
earnings behaviour, so it automatically leads to create the accounting 
information more credible and relevant to outsiders. 
 
2.2. Previous Research 
There are several previous studies related to corporate governance 
and value relevance on financial information, such as: 
1. Habib and Azim (2008) found that firms with strong governance 
structure exhibit higher value relevance of accounting 
information. The result show that firm-specific economic 
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variables are important determinants of the value relevance of 
accounting information. 
2. Lim (2011) stated that corporate governance on companies’ 
performance. The proxies of corporate governance which is 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, size of boards, 
and the independents commissioners. This research document 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and the increase 
of proportion of independent commissioner can improve 
companies’ performance (ROE). Size of boards does not affect 
the companies’ performance. 
3. Where Alkdai and Hanefah (2012) examined the relationship 
between some boards of director characteristics. The result 
shows that the board size is not an important factor to affect the 
value relevance of accounting information. It was revealed that 
there is a positive but non-significant relationship between the 
board independency and value relevance of accounting 
information but this research failed to find that splitting the roles 
of CEO from that of the board chairman increases value 
relevance of accounting information. The result also indicates 
that there is not strong influence for availability of Muslims in 
board of director on value relevance of accounting information. 
4. Subekti (2012) investigated the usefulness of accounting 
information for Indonesia listed companies in IDX in 2007 to 
2010 and resulted that institutional equity ownership (a proxy for 
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monitoring effect) positively affects the value relevance of 
accounting information. 
5. Fiador (2013) documented this relationship on listed companies 
in Ghana Stock Exchange by the year of 1997 to 2006. She found 
that net asset value per share is value relevant on the Ghanaian 
market, and even more so when the board size is small or the 
CEO also doubles as the board chair. But for the board 
independence is relatively irrelevant in the market valuation of 
shares, and when relevant has a negative effect. 
6. Ikram (2016) has done research about corporate governance and 
value relevance of accounting information in Pakistan. He used 
board independency, board size and audit quality as a proxy of 
corporate governance. His finding in this research revealed that 
corporate governance have significant effect on value relevance 
of accounting information, especially for board independence 
and board size have positively and significant impact on earnings 
per share. Audit quality have insignificant impact on earnings 
per share while the board independence, board size and audit 
quality have insignificant effect on book value per share. 
7. Sukmono (2015) examined the effect of the commissioners on 
firm value through financial reporting quality. The results 
showed a significant positive effect commissioners through the 
quality of financial reporting. 
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2.3.  Hypothesis Development 
Corporate governance is emphasizing on the transparency, 
accountability, responsibility, independency, and fairness of the company 
in managing and controlling all of the internal and external activities. 
Corporate governance is expected to be able allocate the investable funds 
by investors and provide relevant financial and non-financial information. 
Accounting information that produced by the company must reflects the 
real condition of the company. Based on de Almeida et al. (2009), 
corporate governance seeks to improve the accounting information value. 
Supported by the research of Malik and Shah (2013), they found the 
quality of corporate governance and earnings per share and book value are 
positively and has significant impact on stock price. 
This research uses variable as the proxies of corporate governance 
are: size of board directors, proportion of independent commissioners, 
managerial ownership, and institutional ownership. As the background 
has been explained, these variables are reflected to the five corporate 
governance code in Indonesia.  
This research complements many extant research about corporate 
governance influences the value relevance of accounting information that 
have different result; based on the effectiveness of larger and smaller of 
board of directors in minimizing the agency cost among companies. Some 
researcher believes that smaller board of directors are more effective in 
doing coordination and communication rather than larger board. Thus, 
larger board is assumed to lead to more complicated in making decision. 
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Some of them gives evidence that larger board are associated with smaller 
market valuations (Yermack, 1996 and Eisenberg et al., 1998). This is 
consistent with the view that coordination problems as well as agency 
problems become more acute as a board grows larger. Cheng (2007) in 
Habib and Azim (2008) reports that larger board are associated with less 
variable operating performances. Cheng argues that larger board require 
more compromises among the members to reach consensus and, therefore, 
decisions of larger board are less extreme.  
On the other hand, some of extant studies found that the larger and 
powerful board help to strengthen the link between corporations and their 
environments, also provide counsel and advice regarding strategic options 
for the firm and play a crucial role in creating corporate identity (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989 and Rahman and Ali, 2006). According to Isshaq et al. 
(2009), as larger size of board directors is effective in doing monitoring 
and coordinating that will boost up the value of the company. 
Based on these findings, it can explain the positive effect of board 
size on earnings and net asset value. 
 
H1a : the size of board directors has positive effect on the value 
relevance of earnings per share 
H1b : the size of board directors has positive effect on the value 
relevance of net asset value 
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Independent commissioners defined as the commissioners who have 
no affiliation relationship with the company, commissioners, directors, or 
the main shareholders in that company and have no business relationship 
with the company, directly or indirectly. Independent commissioners is 
believed to be more wary in monitoring decision making by management 
also the managerial behaviour. 
Based on Amri (2011), independent commissioners has the power to 
encourage the implementation of good corporate governance in company 
through the empowerment of board commissioners’ function, in order to 
effectively monitor and give advice to directors also adding the firm value. 
Company needs the role of independent commissioners who monitor 
the activity without any influence of other party. The effective supervision 
of independent commissioners will decline the possibility of agency 
problem arise. 
Independent commissioners are more effective in exercising their 
control function because they are less influenced by management (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Beasley (1996) states that monitoring of the quality of 
financial reporting by independent boards reduces the likelihood of 
financial fraud. Firth et al. (2007) indicate that the presence of 
independent commissioners improves the earnings quality of Chinese 
firms. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) confirm the same result in their 
finding for a sample of Greek firms.  
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H2a : the proportion of independent commissioners has positive 
effect on the value relevance of earnings per share 
H2b : the proportion of independent commissioners has positive 
effect on the value relevance of net asset value 
 
Based on research done by Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency 
theory posits that managerial ownership and institutional ownership are 
the main mechanism of corporate management that help to control agency 
problem. Research done by Lim (2011) provides evidence that managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership influence company performance. 
Managerial ownership emphasizes on the percentage of ownership 
that owned by management of that company. Managerial ownership is 
expected to be able reducing the opportunistic managers’ behaviour 
because they directly feel the effect of the decision. 
Based on Chen and Yuan (2004), the mechanism of managerial 
ownership motivates managers to minimize the agency cost. They also 
found that managerial ownership influence the firm in maximizing the 
profitability. Ahmed (2008) documents his research about high 
managerial ownership is a positive internal monitor that will reduce the 
existence of agency conflicts.  
Based on good corporate governance codes, the existence of 
managerial ownership emphasize about the responsibility. As 
management which also the shareholders, will do their job perfectly and 
responsible to the obligations. Managerial ownership will increase the 
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company performance (Lim, 2011). Alves (2012) found that the quality 
and credibility of financial reporting is increase by having the managerial 
ownership. 
 
H3a : managerial ownership has positive effect on the value 
relevance of earnings per share 
H3b : managerial ownership has positive effect on the value 
relevance of net asset value 
 
Whether institutional ownership is percentage of shares of company 
that owned by institution such as insurance company, banks, investment 
company, or other company. Institutional ownership mechanism can be 
used as an efficient controlling and monitoring tool in allocating resources 
by managers. 
The existence of institutional investors is assumed to be effective 
monitor in every decision making process. If the percentage of 
institutional ownership is high, the level of monitoring in that company is 
stricter. Institutional ownership tends to emphasize the accountability and 
fairness of corporate governance mechanism. 
Based on the study of Laila (2011), institutional ownership has 
positive relationship with firm value. Whether Sasan, Ali and Mohammad 
(2013) shows there are relationship between institutional ownership and 
value relevance of accounting information. They found that the increase 
in institutional ownership reduces the value relevance of balance sheet 
  
25 
 
information, but it increases the value relevance of income statement 
information. 
H4a : institutional ownership has positive effect on the value 
relevance of earnings per share 
H4b : institutional ownership has positive effect on the value 
relevance of net asset value  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Research Type 
The type of this study is an empirical research. The hypothesis 
testing is performed in order to find evidence regarding the impact of 
corporate governance on value relevance of accounting information.  
 
3.2. Population and Sample 
The population in this research is all companies listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in the year of 2012 – 2016. This period are chosen because 
of prior to 2012 was reported using the US GAAP which differ to IFRS, that 
was implemented on that year.  
By using purposive sampling method, the sample in this research is 
taken base on the established criteria in order to avoid some error that will 
affect the result. The criterias are: 
1. Companies listed in IDX for the year 2012 until 2016 
2. Companies that provide complete audited financial statement  
3. Companies have positive earnings value and positive total equity 
4. Companies with complete data needed in this research. 
 
3.3.Data Collection Method 
This research uses secondary data that obtained from the website of 
IDX (www.idx.com) and Yahoo Finance (www.finance.yahoo.com). 
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3.4. Measurement of Variables 
1.  Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable in this study is Shares Price (𝑷𝒊𝒕).  
Shares price used for this financial research is closing price at the-end-
of-year of firm (𝒊) in period (𝒕). The data of shares price is obtain from 
the website of Yahoo Finance (www.finance.yahoo.com). The closing 
date are: 
Table 3.1 
Closing Date for Research Period 
 
Year Closing Date 
2012 December 28th 
2013 December 30th 
2014 December 30th 
2015 December 30th 
2016 December 30th 
 
 
2. Independent Variable 
a. Earnings per share (𝐸𝑃𝑆) 
Earnings per share is capturing in the income statement which is the 
important key for investors. EPS breaks down a company's profits 
on a per-share basis, which is especially useful for tracking 
performance over long time periods. So, investors can make decision 
based on this information. 
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𝑬𝑷𝑺 =
𝒏𝒆𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆
𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈
 
b. Net asset value (𝑁𝐴𝑉) 
Net asset value as known as book value is capturing the status of the 
balance sheet. The balance sheet portrays the financial strength of 
the company by showing what the company owns and what it owes 
on a certain date. 
𝑵𝑨𝑽 =
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈
 
c. Size of board directors 
Size of board directors refers to the numbers of members 
constituting the directorship board. This will include all directors in 
a company. 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑩𝒐𝑫 (𝑩𝑺) =  𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔 
 
d. The proportion of independent commissioners 
The proportion of independent commissioners, usually used as a 
measure of board independence, is the percentage of external 
commissioners on the board (Fiador, 2013).  This variable is using 
ratio scale: 
 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 
(𝑰𝑵𝑫) =
𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔
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e. Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership is the amount ownership of company as 
measured by percentage of shares owned by the company’s 
management. 
% 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑  
(𝑴𝑶) =  
𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚′𝒔 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔
 𝑿 𝟏𝟎𝟎% 
 
f. Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership refers as ownership of company as measured 
by percentage of shares owned by the institutional investors.  
% 𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 
(𝑰𝑶) 
=  
𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚′𝒔 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔
 𝑿 𝟏𝟎𝟎% 
 
3. Control Variable 
a. Firm Size 
Firm size as the control variable is used for controlling the influence 
of independent variable which is corporate governance, towards the 
dependent variable which is value relevance of accounting 
information. Firm size is scale about the size of a company that can 
be described by the total assets of the company and it is related to 
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the value of the company. The calculation of firm size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬 = 𝐥𝐧 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 
 
3.5.  Data Analysis 
3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics analysis gives information about the basic 
features of the data in this research, such as the value of average, 
maximum, minimum, and standard deviation. 
 
3.5.2. Classic Assumption Test 
The test aims to give assurance whether the data used are met the 
requirement in regression model.  
 
a. Normality Test 
Normality test are used for determining the collected data normally 
distributed or not. This research uses Kolmogorov-Smirnov type of 
normality test. The data is normally distributed if the value of 
Asymp-Sig more than 0.05, and vice versa, the data will categorized 
as abnormally distributed if the value less than 0.05. 
 
b. Multicollinearity Test 
One of the requirement in doing regression model is free from 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity test used for knowing the 
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presence deviation of multicollinearity, which is linear relationship 
among independent variables in regression model. This research 
performs VIF (variance inflation factor) for detecting the presence 
of multicollinearity.  
 If the tolerance < 0.1, VIF > 10, there is existence of 
multicollinearity. 
 If the tolerance > 0.1, VIF < 10, there is no multicollinearity. 
 
c. Heteroskedasticity Test 
Heteroskedasticity test is used for knowing the existence of 
inequality variance in the regression model. Good regression model 
should not meet heteroskedasticity (Santoso, 2010 in Lim, 2011). To 
detect heteroskedasticity, there are several ways can be perform, one 
of them is using Park Test, that done by transforming the square of 
residual value to log natural (LN[RES2]). Afterwards, it will be the 
dependent variable in regressing with the variable independent.  
 
d. Auto-correlation Test 
Auto-correlation test aims to detect the correlation between the 
residual values of one observation to other observation in the 
regression analysis. The method used in this research is Durbin 
Watson (DW) test by doing comparison between DW’s table and the 
resulted table. 
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3.5.3. Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis in this research employ a modified Ohlson (1995) 
earnings model of stock valuation. In this model, 𝐸𝑃𝑆 and 𝑁𝐴𝑉 used as 
the crucial indicators of firm value. In line with current value relevance 
research where the shares price is regressed on earnings and net asset 
value. It leads in determining the relationship between shares price and 
accounting information. The model for this study is given as: 
 
𝑷𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑽𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑩𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑴𝑶𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟔𝑰𝑶𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟕𝑩𝑺 ∗ 𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑰𝑵𝑫 ∗ 𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑴𝑶 ∗ 𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑰𝑶 ∗ 𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑩𝑺 ∗ 𝑵𝑨𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑰𝑵𝑫 ∗ 𝑵𝑨𝑽𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑴𝑶 ∗ 𝑵𝑨𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑰𝑶 ∗ 𝑵𝑨𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟔𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊𝒕 
 
Where,  
P : Shares price 
EPS : Earnings per share 
NAV : Net asset value 
BS : Size of board director  
IND : Proportion of independent commissioners  
MO : Managerial ownership 
IO : Institutional ownership 
SIZE : Firm Size 
i  : Company 
t : Period  
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Significance level for testing the hypothesis is α=10% with the level of 
confidence of 90%. Thus, the hypothesis is:  
 Accepted; if the significance value is < 0,1 
 Not accepted; if the significance value is ≥ 0,1 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Sample Selection 
Based on sample criteria for this research, 164 companies have been 
selected through the process as follows: 
Table 4.1 
Sample Selection Process 
 
Public listed companies in IDX 2012 until 2016 452 
Eliminated:  
1. Financial Companies  (82) 
2. Companies experienced loss in research period 
(negative earnings) 
(160) 
3. Companies with equity deficiency (4) 
4. Incomplete data (29) 
5. Unavailability of data (13) 
Total sample 164 
Total observation year 5 
Total number of sample during research period 820 
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
In this study, descriptive statistics output are needed for explaining 
and describing about the frequency distribution. It consists of the minimum 
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value, maximum value, average value, and standard deviation from each 
variable. The results by using SPSS are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shares price has Rp. 35 and Rp. 63.900 for the minimum and 
maximum value, respectively; mean value for this variable is Rp. 2674,34 
and the standard deviation is 6205,93. Earnings per share has minimum 
value Rp. 0, 02 and maximum value Rp. 17.621; average value Rp. 330,6 
and the standard deviation is 1311,37. The lowest net asset value is Rp. 1,39 
and Rp. 48.307,94 for its highest value; reach Rp. 1952,34 for the average 
and 4638,93 for its standard deviation. 
The lowest value in board size is 2 person and maximum value 
stands on 14 person; mean value for this variable is 5,17 and the standard 
deviation is 1,98. The highest proportion of independent commissioners is 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SHARES_PRICE 820 35.00 63900.00 2674.3426 6205.93273 
EPS 820 .02 17621.00 330.5952 1311.37157 
NAV 820 1.39 48307.94 1952.3346 4638.92439 
BS 820 2.00 14.00 5.1780 1.97914 
IND 820 .00 1.00 .3701 .13040 
MO 820 .0000 .9200 .048261 .1205816 
IO 820 .0000 .9897 .645332 .1962127 
SIZE 820 22.29 33.20 28.7182 1.69913 
Valid N (listwise) 820     
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1 and the lowest is 0 (there is no corporate commissioners from outsiders); 
it has the mean value of 0,37 and the standard deviation is 0,13. 
The maximum value of managerial ownership variable is 0,92 and 
the minimum is 0 (no managerial ownership); whether the average value is 
0,048 and 0,12 for the standard deviation. On the other hand, institutional 
ownership has the highest value in 0,98 and the lowest is 0 (full managerial 
ownership), reach 0,64 for the average value and the standard deviation is 
0,19. Size of firm as the control variable has the lowest value in 22,29 and 
the highest value is 33,2; whether the mean value is 28,71 and standard 
deviation value is 1,7. 
From the table above, the mean of shares price, EPS, NAV, and 
managerial ownership are lower than their standard deviation. It means that 
they are fluctuated not in significant amount in samples companies. Whether 
the average value of size of board directors, the proportion of independent 
commissioners, institutional ownership, and firm size are higher than their 
standard deviation. It represents that they are fluctuated in significant 
amount in samples companies. 
 
4.3. Classic Assumption Test 
Classic assumption test is used for determining the validity of the 
regression model that have to meet the normality, free from 
multicollinearity, heterocedasticity also autocorrelation. Regression model 
for this test is: 
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𝑷𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑩𝑺𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑴𝑶𝒊𝒕
+  𝜷𝟔𝑰𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊𝒕 
 
4.3.1. Normality Test 
Normality test is obtained by using Kolmogorov Smirnov 
with the 5% significance level. The basis to decide whether the data 
were normally distributed, if the significant value is equal or more 
than 0,05. The result of normality test is shown on the table below: 
Table 4.3 
Normality Test Before Modification 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
  
Unstandardized 
Residual 
N 820 
Normal Parametersa,,b Mean .0000000 
Std. Deviation 5.34364962E3 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .233 
Positive .233 
Negative -.175 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 6.662 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
 
From the table 4.3, it shows that the value of Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) is 0,000 which lower than 0,05. It indicate the data were not 
normally distributed. To fulfil the regression model, the data were 
transformed to Log Natural (LN) on the variable of Shares Price, 
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Earning Per Share and Net Asset Value to simplify their value. The 
regression model after modification is: 
 
𝑳𝒏𝑷𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒏𝑵𝑨𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑩𝑺𝒊𝒕
+  𝜷𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑴𝑶𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟔𝑰𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝝁𝒊𝒕 
This new regression model will be employed in doing classic 
assumption test. The result of normality test after modification is 
shown on the table 4.4. 
 
After the modification, the significant value is 0,389 which 
more than 0,05. It concludes that the data are normally distributed. 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Normality Test After Modification 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
  
Unstandardized 
Residual 
N 820 
Normal Parametersa,,b Mean .0000000 
Std. Deviation .88982560 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .032 
Positive .032 
Negative -.031 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .903 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .389 
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4.3.2. Multicollinearity Test 
Regression model are free from multicollinearity if the 
tolerance value is more than 0,01 and the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) is less than 10. From table 4.5, as the result of multicollinearity 
test, all of the independent variables are free from multicollinearity 
because the VIF are less than 10 and the tolerance value are more 
than 0,01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.3. Heteroskedasticity Test  
Heteroskedasticity in this study is tested by using Park Test. 
The requisite to be stated free from heteroskedasticity is the 
significant value must be equal or more than 0,05 and the test result 
is shown on the table 4.6. The regression model is free from 
Table 4.5 
Multicollinearity 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
LN_EPS .576 1.736 
LN_NAV .588 1.701 
BS .688 1.454 
IND .983 1.017 
MO .684 1.463 
IO .701 1.426 
SIZE .587 1.702 
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heteroskedasticity because the significant value from each of 
variables in this study is more than 0,05 and indicates that the 
regression model is efficient to test the hypothesis. 
Table 4.6 
Heteroskedasticty 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1.198 1.665  -.719 .472 
LN_EPS -.015 .055 -.012 -.265 .791 
LN_NAV .106 .077 .063 1.386 .166 
BS .086 .048 .076 1.796 .073 
IND .753 .605 .044 1.244 .214 
MO .512 .785 .028 .653 .514 
IO .493 .476 .043 1.036 .301 
SIZE -.075 .060 -.057 -1.252 .211 
 
4.3.4. Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation test in this study is tested using Durbin-
Watson test. The decision basis is dU<DW<4-dU so that the 
regression model is free from autocorrelation. The result is shown 
on the table 4.7: 
 
 
Table 4.7 
Autocorrelation 
Durbin-Watson Test 
 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .792a .627 .624 .89365 .627 194.947 7 812 .000 1.940 
  
41 
 
DW from this regression model is 1,94 which is to be 
between dU 1,898 and 4-dU 2,101. It can be concluded that the 
regression model is free from autocorrelation. 
 
4.4. Hypothesis Testing 
To test the hypothesis of this study, the researcher uses multiple 
regression analysis in obtaining the F statistics value, adjusted R Square 
value, coefficient value, and the significant value. Table 4.8 shows the result 
of hypothesis testing by using multiple regression analysis. 
 
Table 4.8 
Result: Hypothesis Testing 
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From the table above, the value of F is 111,398 with the 
significance 0,000 indicates that the regression model is fit in 
answering the research problems. The adjusted R squared is 66,9% 
which indicates the percentage of independent variables can 
explain and describe the dependent variable. The significant value 
of EPS is 0,000 that means EPS is positively affect the shares 
price, while NAV does not affect shares price because the value 
shows insignificant and negatively related.  
For the purpose of this study, Ohlson regression model 
incorporates the interaction terms between corporate governance 
variables and the accounting measures of value. The hypothesis 
testing result shows that the value of BS*EPS which 0,000 < 0,1 and 
the coefficient is 0,054, indicates that size of board directors is 
positively affecting the value relevance of EPS, it means H1a is 
accepted. Moreover, value of BS*NAV 0,000 < 0,1 with -0,057 as 
the coefficient value, indicates that the size of board directors has 
negative effect on value relevance of NAV; it means H1b is not 
accepted. 
IND*EPS has the significance value which 0,000 < 0,1 and 
the coefficient value is -0,682. It shows that the proportion of 
independent commissioners has negative effect on value relevance 
of EPS, it means H2a is not accepted. However, the proportion of 
independent commissioners has positive effect on value relevance 
of NAV. Value IND*NAV from hypothesis testing shows the 
  
43 
 
significance value is 0,001 < 0,1 with coefficients value 0,665. So it 
means H2b is accepted. 
MO*EPS shows managerial ownership has significance 
value which 0,000 < 0,1 with coefficient of -0,945. It indicates 
managerial ownership is negatively affecting the value relevance of 
earnings per share, and it means H3a is not accepted. MO*NAV 
has 0,015 < 0,1 and its coefficient is 0,0461. It indicates managerial 
ownership has positive effects on value relevance of NAV. It means 
H3b is accepted. 
IO*EPS has 0,106 > 0,1 and -0,180 as its coefficient. It 
reveals institutional ownership has a negative and insignificance 
toward value relevance on earning per share, so that means H4a is 
not accepted. In contrast, for the result of institutional ownership 
and net asset value, 0,078 < 0,1 with 0,306 as the coefficient and so 
this interaction term is positive and significant. It indicates H4b is 
accepted. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
From the output has been described, larger size of board directors 
increase the value relevance of EPS. But on the other hand, it will decrease 
the value relevance of NAV. This result is not consistent with the 
hypothesis. Larger size of board directors is believed can lead a better 
control for operational activity also increases company’s performance. 
Operational activity in the financial statements are indicated by the 
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achievement of net income which contains earnings information (Lim, 
2011). So as the size of board director get larger, investors rely more on 
earnings information rather than book value information in evaluating 
company’s performance as the base of investment decision. 
The proportion of independent commissioners has negative effect to 
value relevance of EPS. The result indicates as the proportion of 
independent commissioners get higher, earnings per share loses its value 
relevance. However, the proportion of independent commissioners 
positively affects the value relevance of net asset value. Independent 
commissioners have obligation to independently monitor the overall 
management performance and participate in making long-term decision. 
Especially about the management of company’s funding and equity. 
From net asset value, investor get the information about the source 
of company’s asset. Investors can gain information about the company’s 
financial condition, is it worth to be invest or not. Based on the result, by 
having higher percentage of independent commissioners, investors use 
more net asset value information that stated in statement of financial 
position to evaluate company rather than earnings information, because it 
gives on the whole description of financial condition. This finding in line 
with the study by Boediono (2005), Siregar and Utama (2008), and Ismail 
et al. (2010) that found there is negative relationship between independent 
commissioners with earnings management that resulted bad quality 
earnings. 
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Managerial ownership is hypothesized has positive effect on value 
relevance of EPS and NAV. The result does not really uphold the 
hypothesis. EPS is negatively associated to shares price as the percentage of 
managerial ownership higher. But, managerial ownership has positive effect 
to the value relevance of NAV. This is because of big numbers of managers 
who owned the company tends to do more earnings manipulation. This 
findings in line with the study of Suartana et al. (2014) that managers have 
their own interest to be fulfilled rather than attain company’s goals. Then, 
investors rely more on net asset value information. This result consistent 
with the finding of Lim (2011) that the value relevance of equity increase 
as the percentage of managerial ownership bigger. 
Whether institutional ownership is positively affect the value 
relevance of net asset value, but in contrast, it does not influence the value 
relevance of earning per share. It is because of institutional shareholders 
have a control toward company’s management so they may have alliance 
strategy to manipulate the earnings in order to fulfilled their own interest. 
So institutional ownership is not be able to influence the value relevance of 
EPS. It may be the reason why the information of NAV is used as corporate 
development indicators for investors in making decision. This finding in line 
with the study by Sofwan (2015) that institutional shareholders has 
insignificance relationship with earnings information. 
According to the explanation above, it can be summarized that EPS 
is become more value-relevant with the presence of larger board of 
directors, smaller proportion of independent commissioners, and smaller 
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percentage of managerial ownership. NAV is become more value-relevant 
by the existence of smaller board of directors and composed of mostly 
independent commissioners. Percentage of managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership also become important aspects toward value 
relevance of NAV.  
The usage of accounting information to evaluate the company is also 
based on the consideration what information the investors want to seek out 
and the company’s condition on business environment. This study gives 
empirical evidence about the effect of corporate governance to value 
relevance of accounting information that usually used by investors or 
market participant, which are EPS and NAV.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. Conclusion 
The objectives of this research is to analyse and give empirical 
evidence about the influence of corporate governance towards value 
relevance of accounting information such as earning per share (EPS) and 
net asset value (NAV). This study employed Ohlson regression model 
which incorporates the proxies of corporate governance that are size of 
board directors, the proportion of independent commissioners, the 
percentage of managerial and institutional ownership, which are believed 
suit with the code of good corporate governance. The sample used in this 
study are 164 non-financial companies, with the research period is 2012 up 
to 2016. The total sample is 820 companies. 
The result of analysis shows that: 
 H1a is accepted, it means that size of board directors has 
positive effect on the value relevance of earning per share 
(EPS); H1b is not accepted, it means that size of board 
directors does not has positive effect on the value relevance 
of net asset value (NAV). 
 H2a is not accepted, it means that the proportion of 
independent commissioners does not has positive effect on 
the value relevance of earning per share (EPS); H2b is 
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accepted, it means that the proportion of independent 
commissioners has positive effect on the value relevance of 
net asset value (NAV). 
 H3a is not accepted, it means that managerial ownership 
does not has positive effect on the value relevance of earning 
per share (EPS); H3b is accepted, it means that managerial 
ownership has positive effect on the value relevance of net 
asset value (NAV). 
 H4a is not accepted, institutional ownership does not affect 
the value relevance of earning per share (EPS); H4b is 
accepted, it means that institutional ownership has positive 
effect on the value relevance of net asset value (NAV). 
 
This research concludes that in Indonesia, EPS positively related to 
shares price when the corporate have larger size of board directors and 
smaller proportion of independent commissioners. The market has a higher 
valuation of shares when the EPS reported also tie in having lower 
percentage of managerial ownership. NAV positively related to shares price 
when the corporate have smaller size of board directors and higher 
proportion of independent commissioners. Higher managerial ownership 
improves the value relevance of NAV. In addition, institutional ownership 
only improves the value relevance of NAV. 
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5.2. Limitations and Suggestions 
This research has several limitations, therefore some suggestion are made 
for future research related to this kind of topic: 
1. Future research can use the variables of corporate governance as 
addition or new proxy such as audit committee, CEO duality, and 
corporate secretary and so on. 
2. Further research may choose longer research period in order to provide 
better and more complete analysis; also choose other sector companies 
such as banking or manufacturing that have specific different business 
environment. 
3. This research uses Ohlson regression model. The application of other 
model of value relevance might give different insight and results of 
corporate governance in Indonesia. 
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